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On 12 December 2003, the Heads of State or Government
of the EU met in Brussels to discuss the draft Constitution
which had been submitted to the Intergovernmental
Conference by the European Convention. This text had
been prepared after nearly 17 months work by 105
national and European parliamentarians, representatives
of 28 national governments and the European Commis-
sion. Yet it proved impossible to reach final agreement,
mainly due to strong divergences over voting arrange-
ments in the Council, and negotiations were postponed.
What is the problem? The simple version is the
following. Spain and Poland refused to accept the draft
Constitution because of the changes it proposes in the
arrangements for qualified-majority voting (QMV). The
Nice Treaty had introduced a new system stipulating
three conditions for a positive decision: a simple majority
of states, a qualified majority of votes based on a
reweighting of votes, and the possibility of verifying
that a winning coalition of states represents at least 62%
of the total population of the EU. These arrangements,
which will come into force for EU 25 in November 2004,
were particularly favourable to Spain and Poland. Most
obviously, with populations of just under 40 million,
they had secured 27 votes each, whereas the Big Four
countries, including Germany with a population of just
over 80 million, had been allotted 29 votes each.
Germany and France championed the Convention’s
proposal for a simpler system in which there would no
longer be weighted votes at all; a qualified majority
would require a simple majority of states representing
60% of population. They insist that the principles of
democracy on which the Union rests require that there
should be a more proportionate distribution of voting
power in the Council. The Spanish and Polish Govern-
ments, on the other hand, argue not only that they were
given those terms at Nice and have received public
support from their electorates for enlargement on that
basis, but also that there are good reasons of a broader
nature why the Nice system should be retained.
Neither side showed any inclination of giving in at the
beginning of 2004. Moreover, the public debate has
tended to turn this confrontation into a rather superficial
polemic. On the one hand, this is cast as a clash between
two countries who are known to be stout defenders of their
national interests, and the higher general interest of the
Union. On the other, Nice is said to be necessary to stop
Europe being run by a ‘directorate’ of big Member States.
This article aims to put the voting issue into per-
spective and to identify what is really at stake. The first
section briefly looks back at the evolution of the
qualified-majority voting system, the options for reform
which were considered in the IGC 2000, and the specific
political deals which explain the final outcome at Nice.
It is suggested that the Nice arrangements can partly be
seen as a product of nocturnal political bargaining in
December 2000 which does not have much basis in
general principle of any sort, and that they do give Spain
and Poland a disproportionate advantage. However, it
is also argued that the insistence on more direct pro-
portionality of representation needs to be moderated in
view of the actual characteristics of the EU system.
Finally, the article addresses a number of basic questions
regarding future options, independently of the simplicity
and efficiency of decision-making procedures. Does the
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EU still need a system based on weighted votes in order
to maintain a balance between states? And are EU
citizens ready for a system based largely on relative
population?
It is argued by way of conclusion that the best outcome
on balance for the EU is to accept the move to a dual
majority, but only in November 2009, as is already
proposed by way of compromise in the draft Constitution.
This delay is not optimal from the perspective of efficiency.
However, the Union can make good use of this time to
digest enlargement, establish its limits more clearly and
conduct a more serious public debate, before introducing
what would be a major shift in the underlying premises of
its institutional arrangements.
A Brief Look Back
The voting arrangements of the European Economic
Community were based on a formula giving a balance
between states, not a direct reflection of populations.
The main principle proposed at first was that the three
Benelux countries jointly should not be able to block
what Germany, France or Italy could not block indivi-
dually. Moreover, the vote of Luxembourg alone should
not be enough to permit a veto, whereas an agreement
between either the Netherlands or Belgium and one
large country should be enough to oppose a decision.
The resulting formula was a qualified majority of 12 out
of 17, with 4 votes each to Germany, France and Italy;
2 each to Belgium and the Netherlands; and 1 to
Luxembourg.1 The Chairman of the IGC rejected a
system based on ‘objective criteria’ such as economic
strength, national income or the importance of Com-
munity trade, on the grounds that such a system would
lead to solutions that would vary over time and not be
acceptable to all parties. The choice was between
solutions in which decisions could be taken by a
weighted majority which did not imply a numerical
majority, and solutions in which a qualified majority
did imply a numerical majority. In either case, the result
could be achieved by one of various means: a corres-
ponding calculation of weights and thresholds2 or a
weighting by population.3 A compromise proposal
dropped the idea of using population directly as a
criterion. Instead, it defined as the basic principle the
equality of voting weight between any one big country
and the combination of Belgium and the Netherlands,
such that (if the threshold for a first reading were to be
set at 13 votes out of 17) either a big country or the
Belgium-Netherlands combination would only require
the support of Luxembourg to avoid being in a minority.4
The Dutch openly opposed the weighting of votes,
arguing that, in view of the ‘guarantee of objectivity’
provided by the Commission’s right of initiative, there
was no reason for one country to have more weight than
another.5  In the end, a threshold of 12 out of 17 votes was
agreed where the Council acted on the basis of a
Commission proposal but, to achieve a compromise
between the Netherlands and the other five, it was agreed
that the votes of four out of six Member States, as well
as 12 out of 17 votes, would be required in cases where
the Council would be able to decide other than on the
basis of a Commission proposal.6
The principle of weighting of votes remained unques-
tioned for decades, in part because it was irrelevant so
long as unanimity remained the rule in practice. From
the first major adjustment in 1973 until the 1995 enlarge-
ment, the system was basically extrapolated, with the
acceding countries being slotted into their respective
‘clusters’.7 By this time, however, the situation was
already entering into crisis.
First, the balance between big and small countries
was felt to be slipping too far in favour of the small. The
share of votes of each big country was constantly being
reduced. The allocation of votes to each of the Big Four
countries was raised to 10 votes with the first enlargement,
and has stayed there ever since even as the total number
votes has increased – to 58 in EU 9, 63 in EU 10, 76 in
EU 12 and 87 in EU 15. And the overall balance was
changing. Until the mid-1980s the basic balance was
accepted to be that ‘no more than one big Member State
could be out-voted, but that the big Member States
could not by themselves out-vote the smaller Member
States’.8  Since the Iberian enlargement, it has been
possible for two of the biggest Member States to be out-
voted. Simple extrapolation of the current system to EU
27 would mean that three could be out-voted.
Table 1
Comparison of the Qualified Majority Threshold (QMT)
as Share of Total Votes and Share of Total Population
EU 6 EU 9 EU 10 EU 12 EU 15 EU27
QMT 12/17 41/58 45/63 54/76 62/87 96/134
QMT as share 70.6 70.7 71.4 71.1 71.3 71.6
of total votes
QMT as share 67.7 70.5 70.2 63.4 58.2 50.2
of population
Note: EU 27 is an extrapolation of the existing arrangements (see Table 2).
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Second, these concerns about balance started to be
openly translated into comparisons between the share of
votes and the share of citizens. Population had not been
explicitly measured or mentioned before. In 1994,
however, figures began to be produced by the Council
Secretariat and others demonstrating the increasing gap
between the proportion of votes required for a qualified
majority decision and the share of the total population
which was represented by a minimum winning coalition
under these terms (see Table 1).
Third, the clusters of Member States were called into
question. This first came to the surface between Belgium
and the Netherlands, the 10 million Belgians having
always had the same five votes as the 16 million Dutch.
The Dutch request to be given an additional vote met
with strong Belgian opposition at Amsterdam in 1997.
The largest problem, however, concerns Germany.
Following unification, Germany had received recog-
nition of its increased population in the European
Parliament. The Big Four had each had 81 MEPs pre-
viously. Germany received 18 new MEPs, a figure which
coincided with the sum of 6 extra French, 6 extra British
and 6 extra Italians (while, after several decades, the seat
of the Parliament was finally agreed to be in Stras-
bourg…). However, the Germans had, for most of the
1990s, kept quiet about their new situation vis-à-vis the
other Big countries when it came to Council votes. By
1999, however, German attitudes were changing. On the
one hand, major challenges which might have been
upset by quarrels over votes had been dealt with: the
Euro was in place; enlargement was on course. On the
other hand, Germany’s growing self-confidence com-
bined with increasing domestic sensitivity about the
size of its contribution to the EU budget. Consequently,
in the run-up to the 2000 IGC, Germany made it clear that
it really did now want to revise the arrangements to
reflect its real weight within the system.
On top of all this, the reform of the voting system was
explicitly linked at Amsterdam to the composition of
the Commission. With the next enlargement still seeming
fairly far away and likely to be of manageable propor-
tions, and amid concern that wrangling over votes might
complicate other urgent negotiations, decisions over
voting arrangements were left over to next time. The
‘Protocol on the Institutions’ stated that the principle of
one Commissioner per Member State would only be
confirmed if voting arrangements were found which
were satisfactory to all. Most of the countries having two
Commissioners were anxious to be compensated, but
this linkage was of particular importance to Spain. The
principle of one Commissioner per Member State would
mean undoing the package by which it had been agreed
that Spain would have only 8 votes in the Council
compared to the 10 enjoyed by each of the Big Four, in
exchange for having the same number as them (two) of
Members of the Commission. Spain insisted on finding
some means to maintain its medium-big status.
Nice Options
In the run-up to Nice, several options were on the table
as possible starting points for the final round of
negotiations.9
• the Portuguese proposal for limited reweighting,
which doubled the number of votes of all countries
and gave the biggest five countries another five
votes in addition to this in order to compensate the
loss of a second Commissioner. This would more or
less maintain the existing relationships – for example,
the ratio between the number of votes allocated to
the biggest countries and the smallest countries
would only slightly increase from the present
situation (25:4 compared to 10:2).
• the Italian proposal for a generalised reweighting on
the basis of a more political approach, which would
maintain the existing clusters but stretch the distri-
bution further such that a) all countries would have
more votes – and could thus present the outcome in
a favourable light – but some would gain more than
others by way of compensation (the ratio between
the biggest and the smallest would double – 33:3 as
compared to compared to 10:2) ; and b) the stretching
would permit additional differentiation to take
account of the enlarged membership.
• the Swedish proposal for a generalised reweighting
on the basis of an arithmetical approach, giving
states a number of votes equal to double the square
root of its population, which naturally gives Germany
more votes than others.
• two variants of a double majority requiring votes as
states and as populations: the model pursued at
Amsterdam by Germany combining a weighted vote
as states with a qualified majority requirement in
terms of population, and the Commission’s proposal
for a dual simple majority of states and of populations.
The dual majority was seen to favour Germany at one
end and the smallest countries at the other, and was then
as now resisted by the other big and the middle countries.
The starting point for the final agreement was generalised
reweighting as under the ‘Italian’proposal. This proposal,
however, had to be adjusted first to principle and then
to politics.
The immediate question of principle was that, the
more the votes were stretched in the direction of propor-
tionality in order to satisfy the biggest countries, the more
likely it became that a qualified majority of votes could
be obtained by a minority of states, which is generally
agreed to be unacceptable. The principle has not needed
to be spelled out before, since so far the distribution of
votes and the threshold for a qualified majority have
made such an outcome arithmetically impossible. Already
before Nice it was therefore accepted that this provision
would have to be made explicit for the future.
The first political reality was that France had to have
the same number of votes as Germany. Germany therefore
had to be compensated. This was done in two ways, both
of which in fact reflect Germany’s demographic weight
more exactly. On the one hand, Germany was given extra
representation in the European Parliament. The 2000
IGC  had also had the task of agreeing how to implement
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the decision reached at Amsterdam to set a ceiling of 700
MEPs. The proposal which had been presented by the
Parliament, with widespread support, was for a genera-
lised reduction in numbers per Member State. The
‘democratic minimum’ would go down from six to four,
and the gradient by which additional representation was
granted would be flattened. Consequently, in an inverse
logic to that underlying the generalised reweighting
proposed for the Council, everyone would lose, but the
bigger countries more than the smaller ones. As part of
the deal over voting, it was agreed that, uniquely,
Germany would retain its existing allocation of 99
Members (but no more, what ever happened in the
transitional adjustments). On the other hand, an
additional population criterion was added in the Council.
The minimum share of population in EU 27 represented
by a winning coalition on the basis of weighted votes as
agreed at Nice (255 out of 345) would be 58%, as at
present. The additional criterion stipulated that any
Member State could request verification that a qualified
majority represented 62% of the total population of the
EU. This increase would mean that Germany could be
the determinant element in more coalitions than France.
The second deal concerned Belgium. The Belgian
Prime Minister was in a position of considerable
negotiating strength, stating that the Belgians would be
quite happy to see the
Dutch receive an extra vote
in recognition of their de-
mographic difference….
so long as the French would
do the same for the Ger-
mans. The resulting pack-
age included the provision
that the combined vote of
the three Benelux coun-
tries (13 + 12 + 4) should be
the same as any one of the
Big Four (29), as well as an
increase in the number of
Belgian MEPs (and some
further gestures in the di-
rection of Brussels).
And then there was
Spain. Since Spain could not seriously be given the
same number of votes as the Big Four, a formula was
devised which would give Spain the same blocking
power as any one of those Four. If
a) the Big Four have 29 votes each and Spain has 27,
and
b) a blocking minority is set at 88, then
c) any three of the Big Four plus even the country with
the least votes (Malta) can block a decision
(29+29+29+3 = 90), and so can any two of the Big
Four plus Spain (29 + 29+ 27 + 3 = 88);
ergo Spain has the same blocking power as Germany.
This definition of the blocking minority at 88,
however, was opposed by Belgium and several others,
who saw this as making it too easy to stop decisions. A
Declaration was therefore attached, stating that the
blocking minority threshold would be raised from 88 to
91 once the EU had reached 27 members.
In EU 25, with a blocking minority of 90 out of 321,
the equation more or less holds. Both Big 3 and two-
plus-Spain only need one more country to block, but in
the case of two-plus Spain, this other country has to have
at least five votes.
Table 2 gives an overview of Member States’
populations, the distribution of votes under the arran-
gements agreed at Nice and under the draft Constitution,
and the transitional arrangements from 1 May to 31
October 2004 based on an extrapolation of the present
distribution. The system proposed by the draft Con-
stitution is illustrated for EU 27, although it does not
depend on any particular number of Member States.
How Disproportionate are the Spanish
and Polish Votes?
There is not, therefore, much principle beneath the
numbers of Nice, and the system is certainly very
favourable to Spain and Poland. Yet the German insis-
tence on more proportional representation needs to be
examined more closely. The allocation of 27 votes to 40
million Spanish or Polish certainly seems wildly dis-
proportionate compared to the 29 votes for 80 million
Germans if the reference
standard is that of direct
proportionality.
  However, it has never
been the case that the prin-
ciple underlying the re-
presentation of states in
the EU system qua states
is that of direct proportio-
nality.
  As noted above, the
‘Founding Fathers’ of Eu-
rope explicitly rejected
‘objective’ keys and po-
pulation, in favour of a
distribution of votes re-
flecting a balancing act
between states. This ba-
lance was conceived in terms of clusters of states and
responded to a general principle of ‘degressive propor-
tionality’ (which figures explicitly in the text of the draft
Constitution with regard to the European Parliament)
by which the larger units are under-represented compared
to the smaller ones. This in turn has loosely reflected the
belief that, in such a diverse and sensitive union as the
European Community, the pursuit of consensus and the
protection of minorities are more important principles
than simple majority rule.
The comparison of figures should therefore not be
made in absolute terms but in the context of the overall
pattern of under- and over-representation of states in the
voting system.10  The relationship can be shown graphical-
ly in terms of the share of total votes divided by the share
of total population. A ratio below 1 means relative under-
The issue is not that Spain
or Poland is over-represented
in absolute terms.
In EU 25, theirs is in fact the
only ratio which is of almost
exactly direct proportionality
between share of votes and
share of population.
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representation and a ratio above 1 means over-represen-
tation. The present situation gives Germany a ratio of 0.5,
the other three of the Big Four have 0.7, Spain 0.9 and so
on upwards. Figure 1 compares the present ratios with the
situation of the present 15 Member States in EU 25 under
Nice rules (it is obviously impossible to make such a
comparison for the 10 new Member States).
Seen in this perspective, the picture seems rather
different. The main element of ‘disproportionality’ of
Nice in EU 25 is that Spain is the only country which goes
up, whereas the ratio remains the same for each of the Big
Four, and it comes down for all other countries. In EU 27
the situation is more or less the same, although the Big Four
go down very slightly and Spain goes up slightly less. The
issue is not that Spain is over-represented in absolute
terms. The resulting ratio in EU 25 is in fact the only one
which is of almost exactly direct proportionality between
share of votes and share of population.
In this respect, it is hard to resist the temptation to
compare this pattern of weighted intergovernmental
bargaining with the only comparable experience –
which is Germany itself.
Weighting is quite unusual in arrangements for
decision-making among independent states outside the
UN Security Council, international financial organi-
sations11 and regional common funds.12 Unequal
weighting is also infrequent in territorially-based systems
of representation within federal states. Some allocate
representatives to a second chamber on a proportional
basis, but the members then act individually. Germany
is unique in that the Bundesrat is composed of
representatives of the Länder governments in numbers
equal to the weighted votes given to their Land, who
must act jointly: ‘Each Land may delegate as many
members as it has votes. The vote of each Land may be
cast only as a block vote.’13
If one applies the same calculation of under- and
over-representation to the distribution of the 69 votes in
the Bundesrat to the distribution of votes in the EU after
Nice one finds that the relation of votes to population
of the German Länder in fact follows a very similar curve
(see Figure 2).
The point can also be made that the Germans
themselves group the Länder in clusters even where
large differences in population are involved. The four
Länder with populations over seven million thus have
Table 2
Overview of Member States’ Populations and the Distribution of Council Votes
in EU 15, EU 25 and Alternative Proposals for EU 27
Population EU 15 Extra- EU 25 EU 25 EU 27 EU 27
polation  (01/05/04) Nice Nice Draft
(01/11/04) Constitution
Germany 82.2 10 10 10 29 29  1
UK 59.6 10 10 10 29 29 1
France 58.7 10 10 10 29 29 1
Italy 57.7 10 10 10 29 29 1
Spain 39.4 8 8 8 27 27 1
Poland 38.7 8 8 27 27 1
Romania 22.5 6 14 1
Netherlands 15.9 5 5 5 13 13 1
Greece 10.6 5 5 5 12 12 1
Czech Rep. 10.3 5 5 12 12 1
Belgium 10.2 5 5 5 12 12 1
Hungary 10.0 5 5 12 12 1
Portugal 10.0 5 5 5 12 12 1
Sweden 8.9 4 4 4 10 10 1
Bulgaria 8.2 4 10 1
Austria 8.1 4 4 4 10 10 1
Slovakia 5.4 3 3 7 7 1
Denmark 5.3 3 3 3 7 7 1
Finland 5.2 3 3 3 7 7 1
Ireland 3.8 3 3 3 7 7 1
Lithuania 3.7 3 3 7 7 1
Latvia 2.4 3 3 4 4 1
Slovenia 2.0 3 3 4 4 1
Estonia 1.4 3 3 4 4 1
Cyprus 0.8 2 2 3 3 1
Luxembourg 0.4 2 2 2 3 3 1
Malta 0.4 2 2 3 3 1
TOTAL 481.6 87 134 124 321 345 27
Qualified 62 96 88 232 + 255 +
Majority 13 MS + 14 MS + 14 MS +
62% pop. 62% pop. 60% pop.
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six seats each, which means that Nordrhein-Westfalen,
with a population of some 18 million, has the same
representation as Lower Saxony, with around 8 million.
There can of course be no simple comparisons
between the two situations. The EU remains a union of
nation states as well as – most would say, more than – a
union of citizens, whereas Germany is a federal state
with a very high degree of cultural homogeneity and
common identity. The organ of territorially represen-
tation is the main decision-making body in the EU
(compared to the directly-elected Parliament) whereas
it is the second chamber in Germany.
And yet, if anything, such a comparison would tend
to favour the maintenance of weighting and clusters in
the EU system. If the Germans organise territorial
representation in such a way even where the cultural and
historical context permits a system based primarily on
majority rule between representatives of citizens, then
the arguments in favour would seem to be all the stronger
where such a context does not exist, as in the EU.
The Nice System versus the Convention’s Proposal:
What is Really at Stake?
The opposition of Spain and Poland to the Convention’s
proposal is in large part, of course, rooted in self-interest.
This ‘class’ of Member States benefitted particularly
strongly from the Nice arrangements, but would be
particularly affected in a negative way by a dual majority
in terms of relative weight compared to the Big Four.
Moreover, it is quite clear that Spain, for example, is
thinking in terms of the impact of different voting
systems on specific coalitions of direct interest to it.
Candela thus points out that the NATO 19 would have
94% of the population in EU 25; the Big 6 would have
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Figure 1
Under- and over-representation of present Member States in Council votes
in EU 15 and in EU 25 under Nice rules
(share of total votes divided by share of total population)
Note: Luxembourg is not included in view of its exceptionally high rate of over-representation
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74.6%; the Eurogroup 12 would have 67%; the Mediter-
ranean 7 would have 39.4%; and the Cohesion 12 only
30,6%. If the blocking threshold in terms of population
were to be raised from the Nice 38% to the Constitution’s
40%, then Spain would not be able to defend its interests
even in a full Mediterranean bloc.14
Yet there are certainly also broader issues at stake. In
the first place, the weakness of the Nice system does not
lie only in the proportionality of the votes given to
Spain and Poland. The proclamation of three criteria for
a qualified majority makes
the whole thing even
harder for people to under-
stand, but this apparent
complexity is in fact
almost meaningless from
the point of the view of the
Union. To fix a population
threshold of 62% certain-
ly means that Germany can
be the determinant ele-
ment in more individual
coalitions than can, say,
France. With its larger
population, Germany will in general need to find fewer
partners in order to reach a blocking minority. However,
it is virtually meaningless for the operation of the system
as a whole, as is the provision for a majority of states. Out
of some 3 million possible winning coalitions on the
basis of weighted votes, only 16 would be nullified by
the simple majority provision and seven by the
population criterion.15  Moreover, all such calculations
can be very quickly thrown out of balance with the
additional accession either of a small state (Croatia,
FYROMacedonia) or the very big state waiting in the
wings, namely Turkey.
Beneath all the detailed debates over numbers of
votes and percentages of people, Nice essentially means
the decision to maintain a system of weighted votes, and
a balance based on classes of states. In other words,
independently of French sensitivities, it means retaining
a logic of clusters, with the aim precisely of obscuring
rather than highlighting differences between national
weights. And independently of Spanish and Polish
interests, it means retaining a system in which the lesser
‘orders’ of states are intentionally over-endowed in the
decision-making system precisely in order to prevent
the biggest powers from being able to dominate the
system.
As seems appropriate given the tone of the current
debate, this can be illustrated by comparing two systems
of states in Europe in the first half of the nineteenth
century. At continental level, one had the Congress
System and the Concert of Europe, in which the
Quadruple Alliance took it on themselves to order
things – which is what many in smaller countries today
consider to be the aim of the EU’s own Big Three. And
then there was the only example before the EU of
weighting of votes between independent states in a
political union, namely the Deutsche Bund (German
Confederation) created by the Federal Act of 1815 and
the Vienna Final Act of 1820, which lasted until 1866.
The Bund was composed of 41 states, of which two,
Austria and Prussia, were larger than all the others,
together representing some 58% of the total population.
The Inner Council of the Diet in Frankfurt decided by
simple majority out of a total 17 votes. The eleven larger
states had one vote each. The remaining votes were held
by six curiae of states.16  In the Plenary Assembly, 69
votes were distributed roughly in proportion to
population. All had a
minimum of one, but
Austria, Prussia, and the
four kingdoms of Bavaria,
Saxony, Hanover and
Wurtemburg each had four;
five states each had three;
and three had two.17  The
basic rule was that deci-
sions were taken by two-
thirds majority. The pur-
pose of all this was ‘to make
it impossible for Austria
and Prussia, even if they
acted together with the four kingdoms of Bavaria,
Saxony, Hanover and Wurtemburg, to outvote the rest’.18
Sound familiar?
   The Convention’s proposal has, in principle, many
advantages compared to Nice. It is likely to be more
efficient in terms of decision-making (although, as the
Spanish Foreign Minister has rightly pointed out, it will
not be that simple for Member States to agree on the
definition of the population of a country).19  The double
majority is easier for people to understand and clearly
reflects the dual nature of the European Union as both
a union of states and a union of citizens. And it provides,
at least in theory, for a simple and effective system of
checks and balances: the biggest countries cannot impose
a decision based on their demographic weight alone;
nor can a coalition of small countries impose a decision
based only on their numerical majority as states. In that
respect, it may be argued that this does in fact correspond
to the same kind of logic which underlay the original
deal in the Treaty of Rome. The main difference is that,
with enlargement to 25 and more Member States, it is no
longer possible to come up with an explicit formula
which specifies the balance between all individual
countries, as could be done with the Founding Six. The
only viable alternative is to move to a more generalised
formula based on a mixture of sovereign equality and
demographic weight.
Yet it is clear that not everyone feels comfortable or
confident that this system will be sufficient to ensure a
real balance. It is no longer just a matter of the Franco-
German axis – although talk last autumn of an outright
Franco-German union seems to have fed Polish concerns
in November that a population-based voting formula
would ‘risk a unipolar EU’ with the Franco-German axis
at its heart.20  Fears of a de facto ‘directorate’ have been
strengthened recently by what appear to be renewed
The opposition of Spain and
Poland to the Convention’s
proposal is in large part
rooted in self-interest.
Yet there are certainly also
broader issues at stake.
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British moves to try to join Germany and France in a
triple alliance at the heart of Europe. The three countries
together represent over 40% of the population of EU 27
(at the moment) and are therefore in a position to block
anything. Moreover, financial pressures are increasingly
bluntly being brought to bear, while the immediate
response of Germany and France to the ‘failure’ of the
Brussels summit was to threaten to move ahead with a
core European group of states.
On top of all this, there has been a clear weakening
of the Commission within the ‘institutional balance’.
Historically, the smaller EU members have not had to
rely only upon a putative strength of numbers to ensure
that rules are reasonably adopted and equally applied.
The original deal by which weighted votes and majority
voting were accepted rested partly on the role of the
Commission in guaranteeing fair play. If, as has seemed
to be confirmed by a series of recent incidents culminating
in the suspension of the Stability and Growth Pact, the
Commission is not going to be in a position to defend
anyone or anything, then there may well be broader
interest in finding other means to ensure a reasonable
balance of power.
Beyond this – indeed particularly because of this
atmosphere – questions have to be asked more generally
as to the appropriateness at this time of a Union-wide
population criterion for majority decision-making. This
requires a very high degree of common identity and ‘we-
feeling’ which may well not be felt to exist by many
people across the Member States.
What to Do?
At the time of writing, it is hard to see what can unblock
an apparently intractable confrontation. The Govern-
ments of Germany, Spain
and Poland have all staked
considerable credibility
on their positions. Indeed
it is not impossible that
there will be no solution
in the short term and that
the draft Constitution will
simply be frozen, at least
in the present form, for
some time to come.
What could change?
One possible outcome is a
deal by which one side
drops its demands over
voting in exchange for
something else. In the
current climate, however, it is unlikely that this will take
the form of a side-payment in financial terms, and there
are not many obvious (or appropriate) substitutes.
Another outcome would be to adopt an obvious
compromise between the two. There are various logical
alternatives to either simple maintenance of Nice or
acceptance of the Convention’s proposal, which would
allow Spain and Poland to show that they were being
compensated and Germany to show that it was not
giving in. The Nice arrangements could be revised in the
interests of simplicity by dropping the provision for
possible verification of 62% population, in exchange
for a reweighting of votes: for example, a reduction of
the Spanish and Polish quota to 25 or 26. This, however,
would not solve the German-French question. Another
possibility would be to increase the population in the
Convention’s proposal, to at least 62%. This, however,
will be opposed by all the countries concerned to ensure
that it is not too easy to block decisions in the enlarged
Union.
However, what happens next will depend not only
on the flexibility of those countries, but also on other
actors. Spain and Poland, despite all the contrary
pressures, could find new allies: in November 2003, it
was reported that Austria, Malta and Estonia were
supportive and that the British were more or less
sympathetic to their position. Many questions have also
arisen over the position of France. Why, after such a
battle to maintain parity of votes with Germany at Nice,
has the French Government adopted a position of suppor-
ting the double majority proposed in the draft
Constitution? The German superiority in population
was already recognised at Nice in two ways – through the
provision for verifying the 62% population threshold
and through the further differentiation in representation
in the European Parliament. To get rid of weighted votes
completely may be seen as a way to avoid backing down
over the principle so strongly defended at Nice vis-à-vis
Germany, while gaining a stronger position vis-à-vis the
smaller countries as part of a strengthened core group of
the Big Three. Alternatively, as various reports have
suggested, the French may have been quite happy to let
the Brussels summit crash – perhaps with the idea of
pursuing some completely
new system based on diffe-
rentiation between (core
and non-core) groups of
members.
  This article has argued
that there are no simple
truths, nor absolute rights
and wrongs, in the current
debate. To be sure, national
self-interest is involved
(on both sides), but there
are also different positions
of principle (on both sides).
So what should be done in
the interests of the Euro-
pean Union? It is suggested
here that the best outcome on balance is to adopt the
proposal of the draft Constitution, bearing in mind that
this proposal is already to some extent a compromise, in
that it was agreed within the Convention that the new
system would only be introduced in November 2009.
This proposal is relatively simple, clear and efficient
as a decision-making procedure, which is a good and
necessary thing. It may also contribute to greater
legitimacy of the EU system if citizens can feel that they
The proclamation at Nice of
three criteria for a qualified
majority makes the whole thing
even harder for people to
understand, but this apparent
complexity is in fact almost
meaningless from the point
of the view of the Union.
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can understand a bit more clearly how decisions are
taken. Nice, on the other hand, is unnecessarily, even
meaninglessly, complex. It will prove even harder to
explain to the public – which will have a negative
impact on legitimacy just at a time of political and
practical strain on the system – without increasing
decision-making efficiency. In these terms, there would
seem to be little room for serious discussion, at least if
one wants European integration to continue to work.
The draft Constitution’s
proposal should be appro-
ved – and suitably explai-
ned to national consti-
tuencies – even if indivi-
dual Member States may
feel that they are not
getting the best possible
deal for their own direct
interests.
And yet things are not
quite so simple. There are
some very good reasons
for caution and perhaps
also for delay. In the first
place, as indicated above,
there are some very serious
grounds for reflecting
about what is really at
stake in moving from a
system of weighted votes among clusters of states to one
in which relative weights of national populations are
measured – and felt – in so simple, clear and efficient a
way. To move to a system which is primarily based on
relative shares of overall population, albeit with a formal
requirement to have a majority of states in favour of
decisions, supposes a very high degree of ‘we-feeling’
– that is, a strong perception of common identity as well
as of common interest. The problem is not only that this
may not exist in Member States today. It is not even clear
who ‘we’ may actually end up being. Informed decisions
about basic constitutional rules in any democratically-
oriented political system can only be taken if the
composition of the unit in which binding common rules
are to be applied is felt to be appropriate. This can
obviously only happen if the composition of the unit is
at least known for a foreseeable future. There seems to
be a growing consensus that the EU does need to come
quite soon to a clear agreement about its limits. Beyond
a certain point, it is no
longer possible to con-
tinue simultaneously dis-
cussing what we do and
how we do it – while won-
dering who ‘we’ will be.
      It is usually not the best
solution simply to post-
pone a decision, but there
may be no better option
here than delay. The aim is
not only to put off a con-
frontation of positions. It
is already too late to
introduce a simpler and
more efficient decision-
making system before
enlargement takes place.
  This is the fundamental
failure of Nice. So why not
try to make the best of things and take advantage of the
delay? In the longer run, the Union may actually benefit
from having some time both to come to terms with the
immediate enlargement and to establish its borders
more clearly, before introducing such a shift in the
balance between the EU’s character as a union of states
and as a union of citizens. And there is a very simple
reason for waiting. The experience of living with such
a system may well be seen, even by those who now
defend it, as an irresistible argument for changing it.
There are serious grounds
for reflecting about what is
really at stake in moving from a
system of weighted votes among
clusters of states to one in which
relative weights of national
populations are measured
– and felt – in so simple,
clear and efficient a way.
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1 Conférence Intergouvernementale pour le Marché Commun
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